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Abstract
Isolated qubits are a special class of quantum devices, which can be used to implement tamper-
resistant cryptographic hardware such as one-time memories (OTM’s). Unfortunately, these OTM
constructions leak some information, and standard methods for privacy amplification cannot be
applied here, because the adversary has advance knowledge of the hash function that the honest
parties will use.
In this paper we show a stronger form of privacy amplification that solves this problem, using
a fixed hash function that is secure against all possible adversaries in the isolated qubits model.
This allows us to construct single-bit OTM’s which only leak an exponentially small amount of
information.
We then study a natural generalization of the isolated qubits model, where the adversary is
allowed to perform a polynomially-bounded number of entangling gates, in addition to unbounded
local operations and classical communication (LOCC). We show that our technique for privacy
amplification is also secure in this setting.
1 Introduction
Can one build tamper-resistant cryptographic hardware whose security is based on the laws of quan-
tum mechanics? This is a natural question, as there are many unusual phenomena in quantum
mechanics, such as the impossibility of cloning an unknown quantum state, which seem relevant to
cryptography. However, despite these encouraging signs, it turns out that many common crypto-
graphic functionalities, such as bit commitment and oblivious transfer (with information-theoretic
security), cannot be implemented in a quantum world [1, 2, 3, 4].
Recently, there has been progress using a different approach to this problem, called the “isolated
qubits model” [5, 6]. Isolated qubits are qubits with long coherence times, which can only be
accessed using single-qubit gates and measurements; entangling operations are forbidden. Thus,
in the isolated qubits model, one assumes an additional restriction on what the adversary can do.
Formally, the adversary is only allowed to perform local operations and classical communication,
or LOCC, where “local operations” are operations on single qubits, and “classical communication”
refers to communication between the qubits. (Likewise, honest parties are also restricted to LOCC.
Furthermore, while the adversary can perform an unbounded number of operations, all honest parties
must run in polynomial time.) Isolated qubits can be viewed as special-purpose quantum devices,
which can implement functionalities such as oblivious transfer that are not possible using quantum
mechanics alone. Isolated qubits could conceivably be implemented using solid-state nuclear spins,
such as quantum dots or nitrogen vacancy centers [7, 8].
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Using isolated qubits, there are natural candidate constructions that lead to a variety of tamper-
resistant cryptographic hardware. The first step is to construct one-time memories (OTM’s) [5].
Intuitively, a one-time memory is a device that does non-interactive oblivious transfer, i.e., Alice
programs the device with two messages s and t, then gives the device to Bob, who can choose to
read either s or t (but not both).
Using one-time memories, one can then construct one-time programs [9, 10, 11, 12], which are
useful for program obfuscation, access control and copy protection. A one-time program is a program
that can be run only once, and hides its internal state. More precisely, Alice chooses some circuit
C, compiles it into a one-time program, and gives it to Bob; Bob then chooses an input x, runs the
one-time program, and learns the output of the computation C(x); but Bob learns nothing else, and
cannot run the program on another input.
Unfortunately it is not yet possible to prove the security of these one-time programs in the isolated
qubits model. This is because the proof of security for the one-time memories in [5] is not strong
enough — it allows some extra information to leak to the adversary, which can cause problems when
the one-time memories are used as part of a larger construction.
In this paper we address the issue of information leakage, by developing a privacy amplification
technique that works in the isolated qubits model. By combining this privacy amplification technique
with the leaky one-time memories from [5], we obtain new one-time memories that only leak an
exponentially small amount of information. These new one-time memories store single bits rather
than strings, but these can also be plugged into known constructions for one-time programs [10].
This removes one of the main obstacles to constructing provably-secure one-time programs.
1.1 Privacy amplification
The candidate construction for one-time memories in [5] was proven to satisfy a “leaky” definition of
security, where up to a constant fraction of the bits of the messages could be leaked to the adversary.
This notion of security was not as strong as one would have liked, but on the positive side, the
adversary’s uncertainty was expressed in terms of the smoothed min-entropy, which suggested that
the leakage problem might be addressed using some kind of privacy amplification.
However, there is an obstacle to using privacy amplification with our one-time memories. Usually,
in privacy amplification, the adversary has partial information about some string s (while the honest
parties have complete knowledge of s). Then the honest parties choose a random seed q, and apply
a hash function Fq to produce a shorter string Fq(s), which will be almost completely unknown to
the adversary. This works provided that the random seed q is chosen independent of the adversary’s
actions.
But in the case of our one-time memories, all the information needed to decode the messages —
including the random seed q — must be provided at the beginning, before the adversary decides how
to attack the OTM (i.e., what measurement to perform on the qubits). Thus the adversary’s attack
can depend on q, and so standard methods of privacy amplification may not be secure.
We show a variant of privacy amplification which uses a fixed hash function F (without a random
seed), and is secure in the isolated qubits model. Intuitively, this relies on two ideas. First, we use a
stronger family of hash functions, namely r-wise independent functions, where r grows polynomially
in the security parameter k. These r-wise independent functions can be computed efficiently, but
they behave more like truly random functions, in that they satisfy large-deviation bounds, similar
to Hoeffding’s inequality [13, 14, 15].
Second, we exploit the fact that the only way for the adversary to learn about s is by performing
LOCC measurements on the qubits that encode s. Rather than considering all possible LOCC
measurement strategies, which are represented by decision trees, we consider all possible LOCC
measurement outcomes, which are represented by POVM elements.1 Due to the LOCC restriction,
these POVM elements are tensor products of single-qubit operators. So there are not too many of
them. Say we discretize the set of possible measurement outcomes, with some fixed resolution.2 Then
1POVM elements are defined in Section 2.2, but we do not require these formal definitions here.
2Formally, we consider an ε-net, as defined in Section 2.1.
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the number of LOCC measurement outcomes grows exponentially with the number of qubits; this is
in contrast with the number of entangled measurement outcomes, which grows doubly-exponentially
with the number of qubits. Hence we can use a union bound over the set of all LOCC measurement
outcomes.
We do privacy amplification as follows. We first choose a hash function F from an r-wise inde-
pendent family. We then fix F permanently, and announce it to the adversary. We claim that, with
high probability over the choice of F , this privacy amplification scheme will be secure against all
possible LOCC adversaries, i.e., every adversary who uses LOCC measurements and gains at most
partial information about the string s, will still have very little information about F (s).
The proof uses a covering argument over the set of all LOCC measurement outcomes. First, fix
some particular LOCC measurement outcome M . Let S be the random variable representing the
string s, and suppose the hash function F outputs a single bit F (S). One can calculate the bias of
the bit F (S), conditioned on having observed outcome M , as follows:
ES((−1)F (S) |M) =
∑
s
(−1)F (s) Pr(S = s |M). (1)
(Here ES denotes the expectation value obtained by averaging over S.)
We want to show that ES((−1)F (S) |M) is small. Notice that ES((−1)F (S) |M) is a linear com-
bination of terms (−1)F (s), where each F (s) is a random variable describing the initial choice of the
hash function F . We can use Hoeffding-like inequalities to show that, with high probability over
the choice of F , ES((−1)F (S) |M) is sharply concentrated around 0. This will work provided that∑
s Pr(S = s |M)2 is small, which follows since the Renyi entropy H2(S|M) (or the smoothed min-
entropy Hε∞(S|M)) are large, which holds since the adversary has at most partial information about
S. Thus, one can conclude that, for a fixed LOCC measurement outcome M , with high probability
over the choice of F , ES((−1)F (S) |M) is small, i.e., privacy amplification succeeds.
Finally, one uses the union bound over all LOCC measurement outcomes M . This shows that,
with high probability over the choice of F , for all LOCC measurement outcomes M , privacy ampli-
fication succeeds. This completes the proof.
The above sketch shows privacy amplification for a single string s, but a similar technique can
be applied to an OTM that stores two strings s and t. Here one applies two hash functions F and
G, which output a pair of bits F (s) and G(t). Now there is an additional complication, since the
adversary has the possibility of learning information about the correlations between F (s) and G(t).
To address this issue, one needs to bound the quantity
EST ((−1)F (S)+G(T ) |M) =
∑
st
(−1)F (s)(−1)G(t) Pr(S = s, T = t |M). (2)
This is a quadratic function of the random variables (−1)F (s) and (−1)G(t), describing the initial
choices of the hash functions F and G. This can be bounded using the Hanson-Wright inequality
[16, 17], adapted for r-wise independent variables using the techniques of [14, 15].
Formally, this shows a reduction from an almost-perfect single-bit OTM to a leaky string-OTM.
(That is, given an OTM that stores two strings and leaks a constant fraction of the information, one
can construct an OTM that stores two bits and leaks an exponentially small amount of information.)
By combining with the results of [5], we get almost-perfect single-bit OTM’s in the isolated qubits
model.
1.2 Beyond the isolated qubits model
Next, we study a generalization of the isolated qubits model, where the adversary is allowed to
perform a polynomially-bounded number of 2-qubit entangling gates, in addition to unbounded
LOCC operations. More precisely, this model is specified by a constant c ≥ 0, and a “depth”
parameter d, which can grow with the security parameter k, as long as d ≤ kc; then this model
allows the adversary to apply quantum circuits of depth d containing 2-qubit gates combined with
unbounded LOCC operations. (Honest parties are still restricted to polynomial-time LOCC.) This
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model may be a more accurate description of real solid-state qubits, where one can perform noisy
entangling gates, but the accumulation of noise makes it difficult to entangle large numbers of qubits
at once.
It is an interesting open problem to construct OTM’s that are secure in this model. We show
that our reduction from almost-perfect single-bit OTM’s to leaky string-OTM’s still works in this
setting. More precisely, for any constant c ≥ 0, and any depth d ≤ kc, we show a variant of our
reduction, whose efficiency is polynomial in d, that remains secure in this depth-d model. The proof
uses the same ideas as before.
Unfortunately, the leaky string-OTM’s from [5] are not known to be secure in this setting.
Nonetheless we believe it should be possible to construct leaky string-OTM’s in this depth-d model,
for at least some super-constant values of d, for the following intuitive reason: in order to break the
leaky string-OTM’s from [5], one has to break a particular version of Wiesner’s conjugate coding
scheme [18], and this requires running a classical decoding algorithm on a quantum superposition
of inputs, which requires applying a quantum circuit with a certain minimum number of entangling
gates.
1.3 Discussion
Related work: This paper builds on recent work on non-interactive one-time memories in the
isolated qubits model [5, 6]. Some similar ideas have been investigated in connection with other
cryptographic tasks, such as bit commitment, quantum money and password-based identification
[19, 20, 21]. There is also a related line of work on LOCC state discrimination, involving “nonlocality
without entanglement” and data-hiding states [22, 23, 24, 25].
Deterministic privacy amplification has also been studied for other cryptographic tasks, such as
secret key distribution based on causality constraints [26]. Our results can also be compared to
earlier work on deterministic extractors for special classes of random sources, as well as exposure-
resilient cryptography and leakage-resilient cryptography [27, 28, 29, 30, 31]. However, these earlier
works considered classical adversaries, with various kinds of restrictions; our result, with a quantum
adversary restricted to (unbounded) LOCC operations, seems to be new.
Open problems: The overall goal of this work is to construct one-time programs whose security
is based on the properties of realistic physical devices. One-time memories and the isolated qubits
model are useful steps along the way to achieving this goal, but there remain several open problems.
First, can one prove that these one-time memories satisfy a sufficiently strong notion of security,
so that they can be composed to build one-time programs? Privacy amplification is helpful, but there
may be other issues that affect the security of more complicated protocols, such as the adversary’s
ability to wait until later stages of the protocol before performing any measurements.
Second, can one modify the isolated qubits model so that it matches more closely the properties
of real solid-state qubits, e.g., by allowing a limited number of entangling operations? Our model
involving bounded-depth quantum circuits is one step in this direction.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation, ε-nets
For any two matrices A and B, we write A  B if and only if B −A is positive semidefinite. We let
‖A‖ denote the operator norm, ‖A‖tr denote the trace norm, and ‖A‖F denote the Frobenius norm.
For any vector v, we let ‖v‖p denote the ℓp norm of v. For any two probability densities P and Q,
we let ‖P −Q‖1 denote the ℓ1 distance between them.
We write Pr[E ] to denote the probability of an event E . We write E[X ] to denote the expectation
value of a random variable X . In some cases we write PrX [·] or EX [·] to emphasize that we are
considering probabilities associated with a random variableX . We write PX|Y to denote a probability
density function PX|Y (x|y) = Pr[X = x |Y = y]. In some cases we abuse this notation, e.g., if E
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is an event, we write PEX|Y (x|y) = Pr[E , X = x |Y = y]. Also, if E is an event, we let 1E be the
indicator random variable for E , which equals 1 when the event E happens, and equals 0 otherwise.
Suppose E is a subset of some normed space, with norm ‖·‖. Let ε > 0. We say that E˜ is an
ε-net for E if E˜ ⊂ E, and for every x ∈ E, there exists some y ∈ E˜ such that ‖x− y‖ ≤ ε.
2.2 Quantum measurements
A quantum state is described by a density matrix ρ ∈ Cd×d with ρ  0 and tr(ρ) = 1. A quantum
measurement can be described by a completely-positive trace-preserving map E : Cd×d → Cd×d,
which can be written in the form E(ρ) =∑iKiρK†i , where the Ki ∈ Cd×d are called Kraus operators
and
∑
iK
†
iKi = I. Given a state ρ, the measurement returns outcome i with probability tr(KiρK
†
i ),
in which case the post-measurement state is given by KiρK
†
i / tr(KiρK
†
i ).
A measurement outcome can also be described by a POVM element,3 that is, a matrixM ∈ Cd×d
with 0  M  I. Given a state ρ, the probability that a measurement returns outcome M is given
by tr(Mρ). (In the example in the previous paragraph, the outcome i is described by the POVM
element K†iKi.)
2.3 LOCC and separable measurements
In the isolated qubits model, qubits are only accessible via local operations and classical communica-
tion (LOCC), that is, one can perform single-qubit quantum operations, and use classical information
(obtained by measuring one qubit) to choose what operation to perform on another qubit. LOCC
strategies can thus be represented by decision trees, where each vertex corresponds to a single-qubit
operation, and each edge corresponds to a possible (classical) outcome of that operation [5, 6].
A measurement onm qubits is called separable if it can be written in the form E : ρ 7→∑iKiρK†i ,
where each operatorKi is a tensor product ofm single-qubit operators,Ki = Ki,1⊗Ki,2⊗· · ·⊗Ki,m.
It is easy to see that any LOCC measurement is separable [33].
2.4 Smoothed min-entropy
We recall the definition of the smoothed conditional min-entropy:
Hε∞(X |Y ) = maxE: Pr(E)≥1−εminx,y
[
− lg[PEX|Y (x|y)]], (3)
where the maximization is over all events E (defined by the conditional probabilities PE|XY ) such
that Pr(E) ≥ 1− ε. Note that a lower-bound of the form Hε∞(X |Y ) ≥ h implies that there exists an
event E with Pr(E) ≥ 1− ε such that, for all x and y, Pr[E , X = x|Y = y] ≤ 2−h.
We will need the following “entropy splitting lemma,” which appeared in [32]. Intuitively, this
says that if X0 and X1 together have min-entropy at least α, then at least one of them (indicated
by the random variable C) must have min-entropy at least α/2.
Proposition 2.1. Let ε ≥ 0, and let X0, X1 and Z be random variables (which may be over different
alphabets) such that Hε∞(X0, X1 |Z) ≥ α. Then there exists a random variable C taking values in
{0, 1} such that
Hε+ε
′
∞ (X1−C |Z,C) ≥ 12α− 1− lg( 1ε′ ) (for any ε′ > 0). (4)
2.5 Leaky string-OTM’s
The main result from [5] was a construction of a leaky string-OTM (which stores two strings, and
leaks at most a constant fraction of the information) in the isolated qubits model. Here we state
this result using slightly different language — in particular, we state the result in terms of “δ-non-
negligible” measurement outcomes, whereas in [5] this terminology was used in the proof but not in
the statement of the theorem.
3POVM refers to positive operator-valued measure, though we will not need to use this concept here.
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Definition 2.2. For any quantum state ρ ∈ Cd×d, and any δ > 0, we say that a measurement
outcome (POVM element) M ∈ Cd×d is δ-non-negligible if tr(Mρ) ≥ δ tr(M)/d.
Intuitively, these are the only measurement outcomes we need to consider in our security proof, as
the total probability contributed by all the other “δ-negligible” measurement outcomes is never more
than δ. To see this, consider any measurement, which can be described by a collection of POVM
elements {Mz | z = 1, 2, . . .} such that
∑
zMz = I. Say we perform this measurement on some state
ρ, and let Z be the random variable representing the outcome of the measurement (so Z takes values
M1,M2, . . .). Then the total probability of observing a δ-negligible measurement outcome is at most
δ:
Pr[outcome Z is δ-negligible] =
∑
z : Mz is δ-negl.
tr(Mzρ) <
∑
z : Mz is δ-negl.
δ tr(Mz)/d ≤ δ. (5)
We now restate the main result from [5]:
Theorem 2.3. For any k ≥ 2, and for any small constant 0 < µ ≪ 1, there exists an OTM con-
struction that stores two messages s, t ∈ {0, 1}ℓ, where ℓ = Θ(k2), and has the following properties:
1. Correctness and efficiency: there are honest strategies for programming the OTM with messages
s and t, and for reading either s or t, using only LOCC operations, and time polynomial in k.
2. “Leaky” security: Let δ0 > 0 be any constant, and set δ = 2
−δ0k. Suppose the messages s and t
are chosen independently and uniformly at random in {0, 1}ℓ. For any LOCC adversary, and
any separable4 measurement outcome M that is δ-non-negligible, we have the following security
bound:
Hε∞(S, T |Z =M) ≥ (12 − µ) ℓ− δ0k. (6)
Here S and T are the random variables describing the two messages, Z is the random variable
representing the adversary’s measurement outcome, and we have ε ≤ exp(−Ω(k)).
2.6 Ideal bit-OTM’s
We now define security for an “ideal” OTM that stores two bits a0, a1 ∈ {0, 1}. Note that there
is a subtle point with defining security: while the OTM should hide at least one of the messages
(a0, a1), which one remains hidden may depend on the adversary’s actions in a complicated way.
Our definition of security asserts that, conditioned on the adversary’s measurement outcome, there
exists a binary random variable C that indicates which of the two messages remains hidden. (For
example, C appears naturally when one uses the entropy splitting lemma, Prop. 2.1.)
Formally, we let A0 and A1 be random variables representing the two messages. Our security
definition asserts that the message AC is nearly uniformly distributed, even given knowledge of the
other message A1−C , the value of C, and the adversary’s measurement outcome.
Definition 2.4. We say that a single-bit OTM construction is secure if the following holds: Let
k ≥ 1 be a security parameter. Suppose the OTM is programmed with two messages a0, a1 ∈ {0, 1}
chosen uniformly at random. Consider any LOCC adversary, and let Z be the random variable
representing the results of the adversary’s measurements. Then there exists a random variable C,
which takes values in {0, 1}, such that:
‖PACA1−CCZ − UAC × PA1−CCZ‖1 ≤ 2−Ω(k), (7)
where PACA1−CCZ denotes the probability density on the random variables (AC , A1−C , C, Z), PA1−CCZ
denotes the marginal probability density on (A1−C , C, Z), and U denotes the uniform distribution on
{0, 1}.
4Note that this includes LOCC measurement outcomes as a special case.
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We remark that this security guarantee involves the adversary’s measurement outcome Z, which
is classical rather than quantum information. While this may seem like an artificial restriction
on the adversary, we argue that it is simply a natural consequence of the isolated qubits model.
By definition, the adversary is unable to perform any entangling operations on the isolated qubits
contained in the OTM; thus the only way the adversary can access those qubits is by performing a
measurement, and converting the quantum state into a classical measurement outcome.
2.7 t-wise independent hash functions
Let H be a collection of functions h that map {1, . . . , N} to {1, . . . ,M}. Let t ≥ 1 be an integer.
Let H be a function chosen uniformly at random from H; then this defines a collection of random
variables {H(x) | x = 1, . . . , N}. We say thatH is t-wise independent if for all subsets S ⊂ {1, . . . , N}
of size |S| ≤ t, the random variables {H(x) |x ∈ S} are independent and uniformly distributed in
{1, . . . ,M}.
We will use the fact that there exist efficient constructions for t-wise independent hash functions,
which run in time polynomial in t, logN and logM ; see [13] for details.
Proposition 2.5. For all integers n ≥ 1, m ≥ 1 and t ≥ 1, there exist families of t-wise inde-
pendent functions H = {h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m}, such that sampling a random function in H takes
t ·max {n,m} random bits, and evaluating a function in H takes time poly(n,m, t).
We will use the following large-deviation bound for sums of t-wise independent random variables.
This is a slight variant of results in [14] (see also [15]); we sketch the proof in Appendix A.1.
Proposition 2.6. Let t ≥ 2 be an even integer, and let H be a family of t-wise independent functions
that map {1, . . . , N} to {0, 1}. Fix some constants a1, . . . , aN ∈ R. Let H be a function chosen
uniformly at random from H, and define the random variable
Y =
N∑
x=1
(−1)H(x)ax. (8)
Then EY = 0, and we have the following large-deviation bound: for any λ > 0,
Pr(|Y | ≥ λ) ≤ 2e1/(6t)
√
πt
(
vt
eλ2
)t/2
, (9)
where v =
∑N
x=1 a
2
x.
We will also use a large-deviation bound for quadratic functions of 2t-wise independent random
variables. This is based on the Hanson-Wright inequality [16] (see also [17] for a more modern,
slightly stronger result), partially derandomized using the techniques of [14] (see also [15]). We
sketch the proof in Appendix A.2.
Proposition 2.7. Let t ≥ 2 be an even integer, and let H be a family of 2t-wise independent
functions that map {1, . . . , N} to {0, 1}. Let A ∈ RN×N be a symmetric matrix, AT = A. Let H be
a function chosen uniformly at random from H, and define the random variable
S =
N∑
x,y=1
Axy
(
(−1)H(x)(−1)H(y) − δxy
)
, (10)
where δxy equals 1 if x = y, and equals 0 otherwise.
Then ES = 0, and we have the following large-deviation bound: for any λ > 0,
Pr(|S| ≥ λ) ≤ 4e1/(6t)
√
πt
(
4‖A˜‖2F t
eλ2
)t/2
+ 4e1/(12t)
√
2πt
(
8‖A˜‖t
eλ
)t
, (11)
where A˜ ∈ RN×N is the entry-wise absolute value of A, that is, A˜xy = |Axy|.
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3 Privacy amplification for one-time memories using isolated
qubits
Our main result is a reduction from “ideal” one-time memories to “leaky” one-time memories, in
the isolated qubits model. More precisely, we assume the existence of a “leaky” one-time memory D
that stores two strings s, t ∈ {0, 1}ℓ, and leaks any constant fraction of the bits of (s, t). (Such leaky
OTM’s were constructed previously in [5].) We then construct an “ideal” one-time memory D′ that
stores two bits a0, a1 ∈ {0, 1}, and leaks an exponentially small amount of information about either
a0 or a1 (so that at least one of the bits (a0, a1) remains almost completely hidden).
Our construction makes use of two functions F,G : {0, 1}ℓ → {0, 1}, which are chosen from
an r-wise independent random ensemble. (We will specify the value of r later, in the statement of
Theorem 3.1.) Once the functions F and G have been chosen, they are fixed permanently, and they
become part of the public description of the one-time memory D′. (In particular, the adversary may
attack D′ using LOCC strategies that depend on F and G. We show that with high probability over
the choice of F and G, D′ is secure against all such attacks.)
We define the “ideal” one-time memory D′ to have the following behavior. First, one can program
D′ with two messages a0, a1 ∈ {0, 1}. D′ implements this functionality in the following way:
1. Choose s ∈ F−1(a0) and t ∈ G−1(a1) uniformly at random, e.g., using rejection sampling.5
2. Program a “leaky” one-time memory D with the messages s and t, and return D.
Given the device D′, an honest user can retrieve either a0 or a1 as follows:
1. Read either s or t from the device D, as appropriate.
2. Compute either a0 = F (s) or a1 = G(t), as appropriate.
We now prove the correctness and security of these “ideal” one-time memories D′.
Theorem 3.1. Fix some constants k0 ≥ 1, θ ≥ 1, δ0 > 0, α > 0 and ε0 > 0.
Suppose we have a family of devices D = {Dk | k ≥ k0}, indexed by a security parameter k ≥ k0.
Suppose these devices Dk are “leaky” string-OTM’s in the isolated qubits model, in the sense of
Theorem 2.3. More precisely, suppose that for all k ≥ k0,
1. The device Dk stores two messages s, t ∈ {0, 1}ℓ, where ℓ ≥ k.
2. The device Dk uses m qubits, where k ≤ m ≤ kθ.
3. Correctness and efficiency: there are honest strategies for programming the device Dk with mes-
sages s and t, and for reading either s or t, using only LOCC operations, and time polynomial
in k.
4. “Leaky” security: Suppose the device Dk is programmed with two messages (s, t) chosen uni-
formly at random. Consider any LOCC adversary, and let Z be the random variable represent-
ing the result of the adversary’s measurement. Let M be any separable measurement outcome
that is δ-non-negligible, where δ = 2−δ0k. Then we have:
Hε∞(S, T |Z =M) ≥ αk, (12)
where ε ≤ 2−ε0k.
Now let D′ = {D′k | k ≥ k0} be the family of devices constructed above, using r-wise independent
random functions F and G, with
r = 4(γ + 1)k2θ. (13)
(This choice of r is motivated by the union bound, see equation (33). Here γ is some universal
constant, see equation (29).)
5Choose s, t ∈ {0, 1}ℓ uniformly at random, and repeat until one gets s and t that satisfy F (s) = a0 and G(t) = a1.
Then these devices D′k are “ideal” OTM’s in the isolated qubits model, in the sense of Definition
2.4. More precisely, for all k ≥ k0, with probability ≥ 1− e−Ω(k2θ) (over the choice of F and G), the
following statements hold:
1. The device D′k stores two messages a0, a1 ∈ {0, 1}.
2. The device D′k uses m qubits, where k ≤ m ≤ kθ.
3. Correctness and efficiency: there are honest strategies for programming the device D′k with
messages a0 and a1, and for reading either a0 or a1, using only LOCC operations, and time
polynomial in k.
4. “Ideal” security: Suppose the device D′k is programmed with two messages (a0, a1) chosen uni-
formly at random. Consider any LOCC adversary, and let Z be the random variable represent-
ing the results of the adversary’s measurements. Then there exists a random variable C, which
takes values in {0, 1}, such that:
‖PACA1−CCZ − UAC × PA1−CCZ‖1
≤ 4 · 2−δ0k + 2 · 2−ε0k + 2 · 2−(α/8)k + 4(r + 1) · 2−(α/6)k
≤ 2−Ω(k),
(14)
where PACA1−CCZ denotes the probability density on the random variables (AC , A1−C , C, Z),
PA1−CCZ denotes the marginal probability density on (A1−C , C, Z), and U denotes the uniform
distribution on {0, 1}.
By taking the leaky string-OTM’s constructed in [5] (see Theorem 2.3), and applying the above
reduction, we obtain ideal OTM’s in the isolated qubits model:
Corollary 3.2. There exist ideal OTM’s in the isolated qubits model, in the sense of Definition 2.4.
3.1 Overview of the proof
We now prove Theorem 3.1. It is easy to see that the devices D′k behave correctly. To prove that
the devices D′k are secure, we will use a covering argument over the set of all separable measurement
outcomes that can be observed by an LOCC adversary.
We emphasize that we will be covering the set of all measurement outcomes, which are represented
by POVM elements M , and not the set of all LOCC adversaries, which are represented by the
random variables Z. To see why this is sufficient to prove security, note that for any two adversaries
(represented by random variables Z and Z ′) that can observe the same measurement outcome M ,
the events Z =M and Z ′ =M are identically distributed.
In the following argument, whenever we consider a particular measurement outcome M , we will
also implicitly fix some adversary (represented by a random variable Z) that is capable of observing
that outcomeM . We say that the scheme is “secure atM” if the scheme is secure when the adversary
observes outcome M (i.e., when the event Z =M occurs).
First, we will show that for any (fixed) separable measurement outcomeM , with high probability
(over the choice of the random functions F and G used to construct D′k), the scheme is secure at
M . Next, we will construct an ε-net W˜ for the set of all separable measurement outcomes, and show
that with high probability (over F and G), the scheme is secure at all points M˜ ∈ W˜ simultane-
ously. Finally, we will show that any separable measurement outcome M can be approximated by a
measurement outcome M˜ ∈ W˜ , such that security at M˜ implies security at M .
We set the parameters in the following way: the last part of the argument (approximating M by
M˜ ∈ W˜ ) determines how small we must choose ε when constructing the ε-net W˜ ; this determines
the cardinality of W˜ , which affects the union bound; this determines how large we must choose r
when choosing the r-wise independent random functions F and G.
We now show the details:
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Part 1: We begin with the following lemma, which describes what happens when we fix a
particular measurement outcome M . We assume that M is separable and δ-non-negligible; then the
security guarantee for the leaky string-OTM (equation (12)) implies that:
Hε∞(S, T |Z =M) ≥ αk. (15)
The lemma introduces a random variable C that indicates which of the two messages A0 and A1
remains unknown to the adversary; call this message AC . In addition, the lemma introduces an
event E that “smooths” the distribution, by excluding some low-probability failure events. We then
define a quantity Qc(M) that measures the bias of the message AC , smoothed by E and conditioned
on C = c and Z =M . Similarly, we define a quantity Rc(M) that measures the correlations between
the messages A0 and A1, smoothed by E and conditioned on C = c and Z = M . The lemma shows
that, with high probability (over F and G), Qc(M) and Rc(M) are small.
Lemma 3.3. Fix any measurement outcome M such that Hε∞(S, T |Z =M) ≥ αk. Define η = 2−η0k
where η0 = α/8. Then there exists a random variable C, taking values in {0, 1}, and there exists
an event E, occurring with probability Pr(E|Z = M) ≥ 1 − ε − η, such that the following statement
holds: Say we define, for all c ∈ {0, 1},
Qc(M) = E(1E · (−1)AC |C = c, Z =M)
= Pr(E , AC = 0 |C = c, Z =M)− Pr(E , AC = 1 |C = c, Z =M),
(16)
which is a random variable depending on F and G. Then for all c ∈ {0, 1}, and all λ > 0,
Pr
FG
(|Qc(M)| ≥ λ) ≤ 2e1/(6r)
√
πr
(
2−(α/3)kr
eλ2
)r/2
. (17)
In addition, say we define, for all c ∈ {0, 1},
Rc(M) = E(1E · (−1)A0+A1 |C = c, Z =M), (18)
which is a random variable depending on F and G. Then for all c ∈ {0, 1}, and all λ > 0,
Pr
FG
(|Rc(M)| ≥ λ) ≤ 8e1/(3r)
√
πr
(
8 · 2−(α/3)kr2
e2λ2
)r/4
. (19)
We will prove this lemma in Section 3.2. This lemma is useful for the following reason: when
Qc(M) and Rc(M) are small, this implies security of the devices D′k in the case where the adversary
observes measurement outcome M . We now state this observation more precisely:
Lemma 3.4. Fix any measurement outcome M , and any c ∈ {0, 1}. Suppose that |Qc(M)| ≤ ε1
and |Rc(M)| ≤ ε2. Then
‖PACA1−CE|C=c,Z=M − UAC × PA1−CE|C=c,Z=M‖1 ≤ ε1 + ε2, (20)
where PACA1−CE|C=c,Z=M is the probability density
PACA1−CE|C=c,Z=M(a, a
′) = Pr(AC = a, A1−C = a′, E |C = c, Z =M), (21)
and U denotes the uniform distribution on {0, 1}.
We now prove Lemma 3.4. We can represent the probability density PACA1−CE|C=c,Z=M as a
vector ~p ∈ R2 ⊗R2, whose entries are given by paa′ = PACA1−CE|C=c,Z=M(a, a′). Now define vectors
~u = 12 (1, 1) and
~d = 12 (1,−1), which form an orthogonal basis for R2. Then we can write ~p in this
basis:
~p = α00~u⊗ ~u+ α01~u⊗ ~d+ α10 ~d⊗ ~u+ α11~d⊗ ~d, (22)
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for some coefficients α00, α01, α10, α11 ∈ R. We can write Qc(M) and Rc(M) as follows:
Qc(M) = 4(~d⊗ ~u)T ~p = α10, (23)
Rc(M) = 4(~d⊗ ~d)T ~p = α11, (24)
hence we know that |α10| ≤ ε1 and |α11| ≤ ε2. Finally, note that the probability density UAC ×
PA1−CE|C=c,Z=M is represented by the following vector (call it ~q):
~q = ~u⊗ (2(~uT ⊗ I)~p) = α00~u⊗ ~u+ α01~u⊗ ~d. (25)
We can combine these facts to bound the ℓ1 distance between ~p and ~q:
‖~p− ~q‖1 ≤ |α10|‖~d⊗ ~u‖1 + |α11|‖~d⊗ ~d‖1 ≤ ε1 + ε2. (26)
This proves Lemma 3.4.
Part 2: We let W denote the set of all separable measurement outcomes, and we construct an
ε-net W˜ for W . Specifically, we define W as follows:
W = {M ∈ (C2×2)⊗m |M =
m⊗
i=1
Mi, 0 Mi  I}. (27)
Lemma 3.5. For any 0 < µ ≤ 1, there exists a set W˜ ⊂W , of cardinality |W˜ | ≤ (9mµ )4m, which is
a µ-net for W with respect to the operator norm ‖·‖.
We will prove this lemma in Section 3.3. Now, we will use the union bound to show that, with
high probability, for all M˜ ∈ W˜ , Qc(M˜) is small simultaneously. First, we use Lemma 3.5, and we
set
µ = 2−(α/6)k · δ
4
4m
(28)
(this choice is motivated by equation (37) below — we choose µ small enough that the µ-net gives
a good approximation of any measurement outcome). Also, recall that k ≤ m ≤ kθ. Then the
cardinality of W˜ is bounded by
|W˜ | ≤
(
9m · 2(α/6)k · 4
m
δ4
)4m
= (9m · 2(α/6)k+4δ0k+2m)4m
≤ 2γk2θ ,
(29)
for all sufficiently large k; here γ is some universal constant. Next, we use Lemma 3.3, and we set
λ = 2−(α/6)k · 2r; (30)
then we have that
Pr
FG
(|Qc(M)| ≥ λ) ≤ 2e1/(6r)
√
πr(4er)−r/2, (31)
Pr
FG
(|Rc(M)| ≥ λ) ≤ 8e1/(3r)
√
πr(e2/2)−r/4. (32)
Finally, we use the union bound, and we set r sufficiently large (see equation (13)); then we have
that
Pr
FG
(
∃M˜ ∈ W˜ , ∃c ∈ {0, 1}, s.t. M˜ is δ-non-negligible, and max {|Qc(M˜)|, |Rc(M˜)|} ≥ λ
)
≤ 2 · 2γk2θ ·
(
2e1/(6r)
√
πr(4er)−r/2 + 8e1/(3r)
√
πr(e2/2)−r/4
)
≤ e−Ω(k2θ).
(33)
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Hence, with high probability (over F and G), we have that:
∀M˜ ∈ W˜ , ∀c ∈ {0, 1}, (M˜ is δ-non-negligible)⇒ max {|Qc(M˜)|, |Rc(M˜)|} ≤ λ. (34)
Also, note that λ ≤ 2−Ω(k). Via Lemma 3.4, this implies that the device D′k is secure in the case
where the adversary observes any of the measurement outcomes in the set W˜ .
Part 3: We state two lemmas that describe how an arbitrary measurement outcome M can
be approximated by another measurement outcome M˜ . (Implicitly, we fix some adversary that is
capable of observing outcome M , and some other adversary that is capable of observing M˜ . We let
these adversaries be represented by random variables Z and Z˜.)
Roughly speaking, the first lemma shows that if M is 2δ-non-negligible, then M˜ is δ-non-
negligible.
Lemma 3.6. Suppose that M, M˜ ∈ (C2×2)⊗m, and 0 M  I, and 0  M˜  I. Suppose that M is
2δ-non-negligible, where 0 < δ ≤ 12 , and tr(M) ≥ 1. Suppose that M˜ satisfies ‖M − M˜‖ ≤ µ, where
µ ≤ 23δ · 2−m. Then M˜ is δ-non-negligible.
The second lemma shows that, if the quantities Qc(M˜) and Rc(M˜) are defined in terms of
a random variable C˜ and an event E˜ (as in equations (16) and (18)), then we can also define the
quantities Qc(M) and Rc(M) (by choosing C and E in an appropriate way), so that Qc(M) ≈ Qc(M˜)
and Rc(M) ≈ Rc(M˜).
Lemma 3.7. Suppose that M, M˜ ∈ (C2×2)⊗m, and 0 M  I, and 0  M˜  I. Suppose that M is
2δ-non-negligible, where 0 < δ ≤ 12 , and ‖M‖ = 1. Suppose that M˜ satisfies ‖M − M˜‖ ≤ µ, where
µ ≤ 12 , and M˜ is δ-non-negligible.
Suppose there exists a random variable C˜, taking values in {0, 1}, and there exists an event E˜,
occurring with probability Pr(E˜ |Z˜ = M˜); and let Qc(M˜) and Rc(M˜) be defined in terms of C˜ and E˜,
as shown in equations (16) and (18).
Let 0 < τ ≤ 12 . Then there exists a random variable C, taking values in {0, 1}, and there exists
an event E, occurring with probability Pr(E|Z = M) ≥ Pr(E˜ |Z˜ = M˜) − τ , such that if Qc(M) and
Rc(M) are defined in terms of C and E, then the following statements hold:
1. For every c ∈ {0, 1}, either Qc(M) = 0, or we have:
|Qc(M)−Qc(M˜)| ≤ 2µ
(
2m
τδ
)2
. (35)
2. For every c ∈ {0, 1}, either Rc(M) = 0, or we have:
|Rc(M)−Rc(M˜)| ≤ 2µ
(
2m
τδ
)2
. (36)
We will prove these two lemmas in Section 3.4. Using these lemmas, we now show that the device
D′k is secure, when the adversary observes any separable measurement outcome M ∈ W that is
2δ-non-negligible.
Without loss of generality, suppose that ‖M‖ = 1. (To see this, note that without loss of
generality, we can assumeM 6= 0. We can then multiply M by a scalar factor, as long as 0 M  I,
without changing the distributions of the other variables conditioned on Z =M . Also note that the
δ-non-negligibility of M is invariant under this scaling, see Definition 2.2.) Note that this implies
tr(M) ≥ 1.
Let M˜ ∈ W˜ be the nearest point in the µ-net W˜ ; so we have ‖M − M˜‖ ≤ µ, where µ is set
according to equation (28). By Lemma 3.6, M˜ is δ-non-negligible. By equation (34), we get that for
all c ∈ {0, 1}, |Qc(M˜)| ≤ λ and |Rc(M˜)| ≤ λ, where λ = 2−(α/6)k · 2r.
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Using Lemma 3.7, and setting τ = δ, we get that for every c ∈ {0, 1}, either Qc(M) = 0, or
|Qc(M)−Qc(M˜)| ≤ 2µ · 4
m
δ4
= 2 · 2−(α/6)k, (37)
and likewise, either Rc(M) = 0, or |Rc(M)−Rc(M˜)| ≤ 2 · 2−(α/6)k. So we conclude that for all
c ∈ {0, 1},
|Qc(M)| ≤ 2−(α/6)k · 2(r + 1), (38)
|Rc(M)| ≤ 2−(α/6)k · 2(r + 1). (39)
Using Lemma 3.4, we get that the device D′k is secure, for all separable 2δ-non-negligible mea-
surement outcomes M ∈ W that the adversary may observe:
‖PACA1−CE|C=c,Z=M − UAC × PA1−CE|C=c,Z=M‖1 ≤ 2−(α/6)k · 4(r + 1) ≤ 2−Ω(k). (40)
We can write this security guarantee in a more convenient form. Consider any LOCC adversary,
and let Z be the random variable representing the results of the adversary’s measurements. We can
write:6
‖PACA1−CCZ − UAC × PA1−CCZ‖1
≤
∑
M
Pr(Z =M) ‖PACA1−CC|Z=M − UAC × PA1−CC|Z=M‖1
≤ 4δ +
∑
M : M is 2δ-non-negl.
Pr(Z =M) ‖PACA1−CC|Z=M − UAC × PA1−CC|Z=M‖1
≤ 4δ +
∑
M : M is 2δ-non-negl.
Pr(Z =M)
(
2(ε+ η) + ‖PEACA1−CC|Z=M − UAC × PEA1−CC|Z=M‖1
)
≤ 4δ + 2(ε+ η) +
∑
M : M is 2δ-non-negl.
Pr(Z =M)
∑
c
Pr(C = c|Z =M) ·
‖PEACA1−C |C=c,Z=M − UAC × PEA1−C |C=c,Z=M‖1
≤ 4δ + 2(ε+ η) + 2−(α/6)k · 4(r + 1)
≤ 4 · 2−δ0k + 2 · 2−ε0k + 2 · 2−(α/8)k + 4(r + 1) · 2−(α/6)k
≤ 2−Ω(k),
(41)
where we used the fact that
∑
M : M is 2δ-negl. Pr(Z = M) ≤ 2δ (see equation (5)), the fact that
Pr(¬E|Z = M) ≤ ε + η (see Lemma 3.3), the security bound from equation (40), and finally the
definitions of δ, ε and η (see Theorem 3.1 and Lemma 3.3). This completes the proof of Theorem
3.1. 
3.2 Security at a single point M
We now prove Lemma 3.3. We are given that Hε∞(S, T |Z = M) ≥ αk. We will use the entropy
splitting lemma (Prop. 2.1). For notational convenience, we define σc to be a function that takes
two arguments, and returns the first argument if c = 0 and the second argument if c = 1, that is,
σc(s, t) =
{
s if c = 0,
t if c = 1.
(42)
6There is a minor technicality involving the definition of the random variable C. We have already defined C whenever
Z = M , for any δ-non-negligible separable measurement outcome M . We now need to define C in cases where Z = M
and M is δ-negligible. In these cases we simply define C in an arbitrary way.
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Setting η = 2−η0k and η0 = α/8, we get that there exists a random variable C, taking values in
{0, 1}, such that:
Hε+η∞ (σC(S, T ) |C,Z =M) ≥ (α/2)k − 1− η0k ≥ (α/3)k. (43)
Using the definition of the smoothed conditional min-entropy, we get that there exists an event E ,
occurring with probability Pr(E |Z =M) ≥ 1− ε− η, such that for all c ∈ {0, 1}, and all s ∈ {0, 1}ℓ,
Pr(E , σc(S, T ) = s |C = c, Z =M) ≤ 2−(α/3)k. In particular, this implies that∑
s∈{0,1}ℓ
Pr(E , σc(S, T ) = s |C = c, Z =M)2 ≤ 2−(α/3)k. (44)
We now proceed to bound the quantity Qc(M). We consider the case where c = 0 (the c = 1
case is similar). In this case, we can write
Q0(M) =
∑
s∈{0,1}ℓ
(−1)F (s) Pr(E , S = s |C = 0, Z =M). (45)
Since F is an r-wise independent random function, we can apply the large deviation bound in Prop.
2.6 (making use of equation (44)). This proves equation (17).
Finally, we will bound the quantity Rc(M). We consider the case where c = 0 (the c = 1 case is
similar). In this case, we can write
R0(M) =
∑
s,t∈{0,1}ℓ
(−1)F (s)+G(t) Pr(E , S = s, T = t |C = 0, Z =M). (46)
We will bound this using Prop. 2.7. To this end, we define a function H : {0, 1} × {0, 1}ℓ → {0, 1},
which returns the following values:
H(i, s) =
{
F (s) if i = 0
G(s) if i = 1.
(47)
We define a matrix A ∈ R(2·2ℓ)×(2·2ℓ), whose entries are indexed by {0, 1} × {0, 1}ℓ, and have the
following values:
A(i,s),(j,t) =

1
2 Pr(E , S = s, T = t |C = 0, Z =M) if (i, j) = (0, 1)
1
2 Pr(E , S = t, T = s |C = 0, Z =M) if (i, j) = (1, 0)
0 otherwise.
(48)
A straightforward calculation then shows that R0(M) can be written in the form
R0(M) =
∑
(i,s),(j,t)
A(i,s),(j,t)
(
(−1)H(i,s)(−1)H(j,t) − δ(i,s),(j,t)
)
. (49)
Since F andG are r-wise independent random functions, we can apply Prop. 2.7, setting t = r/2.7
7The careful reader will notice that one can actually use Prop. 2.7 with t = r, and thereby prove a stronger bound.
The argument of Prop. 2.7 still goes through, because R0(M) is bilinear in the random variables F (s) and G(t), and these
two groups of random variables are chosen independently of each other.
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We will use the following bounds on A˜:
‖A˜‖2 ≤ ‖A˜‖2F =
∑
(i,s),(j,t)
A2(i,s),(j,t)
= 12
∑
s,t
Pr(E , S = s, T = t |C = 0, Z =M)2
≤ 12
∑
s
(∑
t
Pr(E , S = s, T = t |C = 0, Z =M)
)2
= 12
∑
s
Pr(E , S = s |C = 0, Z =M)2
≤ 12 · 2−(α/3)k,
(50)
where in the last line we used equation (44). We substitute into Prop. 2.7; this proves equation (19).
This completes the proof of Lemma 3.3. 
3.3 Constructing an ε-net
We now prove Lemma 3.5. First, consider the set
V = {X ∈ C2×2 | ‖X‖ℓ∞ ≤
√
2, X† = X}, (51)
where ‖·‖ℓ∞ denotes the ℓ∞ norm, viewing each 2 × 2 matrix as a 4-dimensional vector. Let δ > 0
(we will choose a specific value for δ later). It is easy to see that there exists a δ-net V˜ for V , with
respect to the ℓ∞ norm, with cardinality |V˜ | ≤ (2δ + 1)4. (For instance, one can describe each point
in V using 4 real parameters, and choose a grid with spacing δ
√
2.)
Next, consider the set of single-qubit POVM elements:
U = {X ∈ C2×2 | 0  X  I}. (52)
Note that U ⊂ V , since ‖X‖ℓ∞ ≤ ‖X‖F ≤
√
2‖X‖. We will construct a 4δ-net U˜ for U , by
“rounding” each point in V˜ into U . Define a function r : V → U that maps each point in V to the
nearest point in U with respect to the ℓ∞ norm, that is,
r(X) = arg min
Y ∈U
‖X − Y ‖ℓ∞ . (53)
Let U˜ be the image of V˜ under this map, that is, U˜ = {r(X) | X ∈ V˜ }. Note that |U˜ | ≤ |V˜ |.
It is easy to see that U˜ is a 2δ-net for U , with respect to the ℓ∞ norm. (This follows because, for
any X ∈ U , there exists some Y ∈ V˜ such that ‖X − Y ‖ℓ∞ ≤ δ, and we know that r(Y ) ∈ U˜ and
‖Y − r(Y )‖ℓ∞ ≤ δ.) This implies that U˜ is a 4δ-net for U , with respect to the operator norm ‖·‖.
(This follows because ‖X‖ ≤ ‖X‖F ≤ 2‖X‖ℓ∞ .)
We are now ready to consider the set W . We can write W in the form
W = {M |M =
m⊗
i=1
Mi, Mi ∈ U}. (54)
We then define W˜ = {M |M =⊗mi=1Mi, Mi ∈ U˜}. Note that W˜ has cardinality |W˜ | ≤ |U˜ |m.
We claim that W˜ is a 4mδ-net forW , with respect to the operator norm ‖·‖. To see this, consider
any M ∈W , and construct some M˜ ∈ W˜ that approximates it, as follows. M can be written in the
form M =
⊗m
i=1Mi. For each Mi, there is a point M˜i ∈ U˜ within distance ‖Mi − M˜i‖ ≤ 4δ. We
then let M˜ =
⊗m
i=1 M˜i.
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We upper-bound the distance ‖M − M˜‖ as follows, by defining a sequence of intermediate steps,
and using the triangle inequality. For all s = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,m, define M (s) = (M˜1⊗· · ·⊗M˜s)⊗ (Ms+1⊗
· · · ⊗Mm). Then we have that M =M (0), M˜ =M (m), and
‖M − M˜‖ ≤
m−1∑
s=0
‖M (s) −M (s+1)‖
=
m−1∑
s=0
∥∥(M˜1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ M˜s)⊗ (Ms+1 − M˜s+1)⊗ (Ms+2 ⊗ · · · ⊗Mm)∥∥
≤ 4mδ,
(55)
where we used the fact that ‖A⊗B‖ = ‖A‖ ‖B‖.
Finally, we set δ = µ/(4m). Then W˜ is a µ-net for W , with respect to the operator norm ‖·‖.
The cardinality of W˜ is |W˜ | ≤ (2δ +1)4m = (8mµ +1)4m ≤ (9mµ )4m, provided that µ ≤ 1. This proves
Lemma 3.5. 
3.4 Continuity arguments
We now prove Lemma 3.6. Since M is 2δ-non-negligible (with respect to some quantum state ρ), we
have Pr(M) = tr(Mρ) ≥ 2δ · 2−m tr(M). Since ‖M − M˜‖ ≤ µ, and tr(M) ≥ 1, we can write
Pr(M˜) = tr(M˜ρ) ≥ tr(Mρ)− µ
≥ 2δ · 2−m tr(M)− µ
≥ δ · 2−m tr(M) + δ · 2−m − µ
≥ δ · 2−m tr(M˜)− δ · µ+ δ · 2−m − µ
= δ · 2−m tr(M˜) + δ · 2−m − (1 + δ)µ.
(56)
Since µ ≤ 23δ · 2−m, and δ ≤ 12 , we have (1+ δ)µ ≤ δ · 2−m. By plugging into the above equation, we
see that M˜ is δ-non-negligible. This proves Lemma 3.6. 
We now prove Lemma 3.7. By assumption, there is a random variable C˜, which is defined by
the probabilities Pr(C˜ = c | Z˜ = M˜, S = s, T = t); and there is an event E˜ , which is defined by the
probabilities Pr(E˜ | C˜ = c, Z˜ = M˜, S = s, T = t). Also, let ρst be the quantum state used to encode
messages (s, t), i.e., this is the state of the one-time memory, conditioned on S = s and T = t.
We start by writing Qc(M˜) and Rc(M˜) in a more explicit form. First consider Q0(M˜), and note
that A0 = F (S). We can write Q0(M˜) in the form:
Q0(M˜) =
1
Pr(C˜ = 0, Z˜ = M˜)
∑
s,t∈{0,1}ℓ
(−1)F (s) Pr(E˜ , S = s, T = t, C˜ = 0, Z˜ = M˜)
=
1
Pr(C˜ = 0, Z˜ = M˜)
∑
s,t∈{0,1}ℓ
(−1)F (s) Pr(E˜ , C˜ = 0 | Z˜ = M˜, S = s, T = t) tr(M˜ρst) 4−ℓ
=
1
Pr(C˜ = 0, Z˜ = M˜)
tr(M˜ν0),
(57)
where we define the matrix ν0 ∈ (C2×2)⊗m as follows:
ν0 = 4
−ℓ ∑
s,t∈{0,1}ℓ
(−1)F (s) Pr(E˜ , C˜ = 0 | Z˜ = M˜, S = s, T = t) ρst. (58)
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Note that ‖ν0‖tr ≤ 1. In addition, we can write Pr(C˜ = 0, Z˜ = M˜) in the form:
Pr(C˜ = 0, Z˜ = M˜) =
∑
s,t∈{0,1}ℓ
Pr(C˜ = 0, Z˜ = M˜, S = s, T = t)
=
∑
s,t∈{0,1}ℓ
Pr(C˜ = 0 | Z˜ = M˜, S = s, T = t) tr(M˜ρst) 4−ℓ
= tr(M˜ξ0),
(59)
where we define the matrix ξ0 ∈ (C2×2)⊗m as follows:
ξ0 = 4
−ℓ ∑
s,t∈{0,1}ℓ
Pr(C˜ = 0 | Z˜ = M˜, S = s, T = t) ρst. (60)
Also, note that ‖ξ0‖tr ≤ 1. We can also write similar expressions for Q1(M˜), R0(M˜) and R1(M˜).
We can summarize this as follows:
Qc(M˜) =
tr(M˜νc)
tr(M˜ξc)
, Rc(M˜) =
tr(M˜θc)
tr(M˜ξc)
, (61)
where νc, θc, ξc ∈ (C2×2)⊗m satisfy ‖νc‖tr ≤ 1, ‖θc‖tr ≤ 1 and ‖ξc‖tr ≤ 1.
We now consider the measurement outcome M . We will construct a random variable C and an
event E , which will allow us to define the quantities Qc(M) and Rc(M). Roughly speaking, C and
E (conditioned on Z = M) will behave similarly to C˜ and E˜ (conditioned on Z˜ = M˜). However, if
there exists some c ∈ {0, 1} for which the probability Pr(C = c |Z = M) is unusually small, then
we will define E to exclude this event, in order to avoid situations where Qc(M) “blows up” because
the denominator is very small.
Formally, we construct the random variable C and the event E by specifying the following prob-
abilities (for all c ∈ {0, 1} and s, t ∈ {0, 1}ℓ):
Pr(C = c |Z =M, S = s, T = t) = Pr(C˜ = c | Z˜ = M˜, S = s, T = t), (62)
Pr(E |C = c, Z =M, S = s, T = t) =
{
0 if Pr(C = c |Z =M) < τ,
Pr(E˜ | C˜ = c, Z˜ = M˜, S = s, T = t) otherwise. (63)
We now show that Pr(E |Z = M) ≥ Pr(E˜ | Z˜ = M˜) − τ . Let us say that c ∈ {0, 1} is “bad” if
Pr(C = c |Z = M) < τ . There are two possible values, 0 and 1, and at most one of them can be
bad. If neither one is bad, then Pr(E |Z = M) = Pr(E˜ | Z˜ = M˜). If one particular value (say 0) is
bad, then we have:
Pr(E |Z =M) ≥ Pr(E |C = 1, Z =M) Pr(C = 1 |Z =M)
= Pr(E˜ | C˜ = 1, Z˜ = M˜) Pr(C˜ = 1 | Z˜ = M˜)
= Pr(E˜ | Z˜ = M˜)− Pr(E˜ | C˜ = 0, Z˜ = M˜) Pr(C˜ = 0 | Z˜ = M˜)
> Pr(E˜ | Z˜ = M˜)− τ.
(64)
We now define Qc(M) in terms of C and E , using equation (16). Note that if c is bad, then
Pr(E |C = c, Z =M) = 0, which implies Qc(M) = 0.
We will show that if c is not bad, then Qc(M) ≈ Qc(M˜). When c is not bad, the events C = c
and E (conditioned on the events Z = M , S = s and T = t) have exactly the same probabilities as
the events C˜ = c and E˜ (conditioned on the events Z˜ = M˜ , S = s and T = t). So we can write
Qc(M) in the form
Qc(M) =
tr(Mνc)
tr(Mξc)
, (65)
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where νc and ξc are the same matrices used to express Qc(M˜) in equation (61). In addition, we can
lower-bound tr(Mξc) and tr(M˜ξc) as follows:
tr(Mξc) = Pr(C = c, M) ≥ τ Pr(M) (66)
≥ τ · 2δ · 2−m tr(M) ≥ τ · 2δ · 2−m‖M‖ (67)
≥ τ · 2δ · 2−m, (68)
tr(M˜ξc) = Pr(C˜ = c, M˜) ≥ τ Pr(M˜) (69)
≥ τδ · 2−m tr(M˜) ≥ τδ · 2−m‖M˜‖ (70)
≥ τδ · 2−m(1− µ) ≥ τδ · 2−m · 12 . (71)
Now we can write Qc(M)−Qc(M˜) as follows:
Qc(M)−Qc(M˜) = tr((M − M˜)νc)
tr(Mξc)
+ tr(M˜νc)
tr((M˜ −M)ξc)
tr(Mξc) tr(M˜ξc)
. (72)
We can then upper-bound this quantity:
|Qc(M)−Qc(M˜)| ≤ µ
τ · 2δ · 2−m + (1 + µ)
µ
τ · 2δ · 2−m · τδ · 2−m · 12
=
µ
τ · 2δ · 2−m
(
1 +
(1 + µ)
τδ · 2−m · 12
)
≤ 2µ
(
2m
τδ
)2
.
(73)
Similarly, we define Rc(M) in terms of C and E , using equation (18). Using the same argument
as above, we see that if c is bad, then Rc(M) = 0, and if c is not bad, then Rc(M) ≈ Rc(M˜). This
completes the proof of Lemma 3.7. 
4 Beyond the isolated qubits model
We now describe a class of adversaries who can perform a polynomial number of 2-qubit entangling
operations, in addition to unbounded LOCC. In particular, we will choose some “depth” parameter d
(which may grow polynomially with the security parameter k), and we will consider adversaries who
can apply quantum circuits whose depth is bounded by d. These kinds of attacks may be feasible
in real physical systems, where one can perform noisy entangling gates. Intuitively, one may expect
that the noise will accumulate when the adversary applies a long sequence of entangling gates; so it
is easier for the adversary to apply shallow (low-depth) quantum circuits.
We will then show that our privacy amplification result for one-time memories (Theorem 3.1)
still holds against these depth-d adversaries, where d can grow polynomially in k, and the privacy
amplification technique now runs in time polynomial in d.
First, we will need a few definitions. Let E : ρ 7→∑iKiρK†i be a generalized quantum measure-
ment. We say that E is 2-local if every Kraus operator Ki can be written as a tensor product of
2-qubit operators (where different Kraus operators Ki may arrange the qubits into pairs in different
ways). As a simple example, if E1, E2, . . . , Eℓ are 2-qubit quantum measurements, then E1⊗E2⊗· · ·⊗Eℓ
is a 2-local quantum measurement on 2ℓ qubits.
Note that 2-local measurements can be viewed as a generalization of separable measurements,
in the following sense. First, if E is separable, then E is 2-local. Also, if E1 and E2 are separable,
and F is 2-local, then E2 ◦ F ◦ E1 is 2-local. Thus any 2-local measurement can include a separable
measurement (and in particular, an LOCC measurement) “for free.”
We say that an adversary is 2-local with depth d if it performs a measurement of the form
E = Ed ◦ Ed−1 ◦ · · · ◦ E1, where E1, E2, . . . , Ed are 2-local measurements. That is, the adversary
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first performs the measurement E1, obtains a classical measurement outcome i1, then performs the
measurement E2, obtains a classical measurement outcome i2, and so on; after the final measurement
Ed, the post-measurement quantum state is discarded.
We say that the corresponding POVM element Mi1,i2,...,id is 2-local with depth d. We can write
it in the following form:
Mi1,i2,...,id = (K
†
1,i1
K†2,i2 · · ·K
†
d,id
) (Kd,id · · ·K2,i2K1,i1), (74)
where theKa,ia denote the Kraus operators of the measurement Ea, that is, Ea(ρ) =
∑
ia
Ka,iaρK
†
a,ia
,
and each Ka,ia can be written as a tensor product of 2-qubit operators.
We now extend our privacy amplification result for one-time memories (Theorem 3.1) to the case
of 2-local depth-d adversaries.
Theorem 4.1. Fix some constant ϕ ≥ 0.
Suppose that D is a family of “leaky” string-OTM’s, as described in Theorem 3.1, but with a
stronger security guarantee, which holds for all measurement outcomes that are 2-local with depth
d ≤ kϕ (rather than for all separable measurement outcomes).
Now construct a new family of devices D′, as described in Theorem 3.1, but where we set the
parameter r (for the r-wise independent random functions F and G) as follows:
r = 4(γ + 1)k2θ+ϕ. (75)
Then these devices D′ are “ideal” OTM’s, as described in Theorem 3.1, but again with a stronger
security guarantee, which holds for all measurement outcomes that are 2-local with depth d ≤ kϕ
(rather than for all separable measurement outcomes).
Thus, if one could construct “leaky” string-OTM’s that were secure against 2-local depth-d ad-
versaries, then one would immediately get “ideal” bit-OTM’s in this setting. Unfortunately, the
leaky string-OTM’s from [5] are not known to be secure in this setting, and so we leave this as an
open problem.
4.1 Overview of the proof
We prove Theorem 4.1 using the same approach as for Theorem 3.1. Most of the argument is
unchanged; the key difference is in Lemma 3.5, where we now want to construct an ε-net for the
set of all 2-local depth-d measurement outcomes (rather than the set of all separable measurement
outcomes).
Let Λ be the set of all 2-local depth-d measurement outcomes:
Λ = {M ∈ (C2×2)⊗m |M = (K†1 · · ·K†d) (Kd · · ·K1), where K1, . . . ,Kd ∈ L}, (76)
where L is the set of all operators K ∈ (C2×2)⊗m that can be written as tensor products of 2-qubit
operators having operator norm at most 1. We will construct an ε-net for Λ, using the following
lemma:
Lemma 4.2. For any 0 < µ ≤ 1, there exists a set Λ˜ ⊂ Λ, of cardinality |Λ˜| ≤ ( 24dm17/16µ )16md,
which is a µ-net for Λ with respect to the operator norm ‖·‖.
We will prove this lemma in Section 4.2. Now, we set
µ = 2−(α/6)k · δ
4
4m
(77)
(the same as in the proof of Theorem 3.1). Also, recall that k ≤ m ≤ kθ, and d ≤ kϕ. Then the
cardinality of Λ˜ is bounded by
|Λ˜| ≤
(
24dm17/16 · 2(α/6)k · 4
m
δ4
)16md
=
(
24dm17/16 · 2(α/6)k+4δ0k+2m)16md
≤ 2γk2θ+ϕ ,
(78)
19
for all sufficiently large k; here γ is some universal constant. This bound plays the role of equation
(29) in the proof of Theorem 3.1.
One then continues with the same argument as in Theorem 3.1: one uses the union bound over
the set Λ˜, while setting the parameter r sufficiently large (see equation (75)). This gives a result
similar to equation (33).
The rest of the proof is the same as for Theorem 3.1. This completes the proof of Theorem 4.1.

4.2 Constructing an ε-net
We now prove Lemma 4.2. First, consider the set
V = {X ∈ C4×4 | ‖X‖ℓ∞ ≤ 2}. (79)
Let δ > 0 (we will choose a specific value for δ later). It is easy to see that there exists a δ-net V˜ for
V , with respect to the ℓ∞ norm, with cardinality |V˜ | ≤ (2
√
2
δ +1)
32. (For instance, one can describe
each point in V with 32 real parameters, and choose a grid with spacing δ
√
2.)
Next, consider the set of 2-qubit Kraus operators:
U = {X ∈ C4×4 | ‖X‖ ≤ 1}. (80)
Note that U ⊂ V , since ‖X‖ℓ∞ ≤ ‖X‖F ≤ 2‖X‖. We will construct an 8δ-net U˜ for U , by taking
the points in V˜ and “rounding” them into U . Define a function r : V → U that maps each point in
V to the nearest point in U with respect to the ℓ∞ norm, that is,
r(X) = arg min
Y ∈U
‖X − Y ‖ℓ∞ . (81)
Let U˜ be the image of V˜ under this map, that is, U˜ = {r(X) | X ∈ V˜ }. Note that |U˜ | ≤ |V˜ |.
It is easy to see that U˜ is a 2δ-net for U , with respect to the ℓ∞ norm. (This follows because, for
any X ∈ U , there exists some Y ∈ V˜ such that ‖X − Y ‖ℓ∞ ≤ δ, and we know that r(Y ) ∈ U˜ and
‖Y − r(Y )‖ℓ∞ ≤ δ.) This implies that U˜ is an 8δ-net for U , with respect to the operator norm ‖·‖.
(This follows because ‖X‖ ≤ ‖X‖F ≤ 4‖X‖ℓ∞ .)
Next, we let L be the set of all operators K ∈ (C2×2)⊗m that can be written as tensor products
of 2-qubit operators in U . We then define L˜ to be the set of all operators K ∈ (C2×2)⊗m that can be
written as tensor products of 2-qubit operators in U˜ . Note that L˜ has cardinality |L˜| ≤ m! |U˜ |m/2,
since every operator K ∈ L˜ can be written in the form ⊗m/2j=1 Kj (where Kj ∈ U˜) conjugated with
a permutation of the qubits. (For simplicity, let us assume that m is even.)
We claim that L˜ is a 4mδ-net for L, with respect to the operator norm ‖·‖. To see this, consider
any K ∈ L, and construct some K˜ ∈ L˜ that approximates it as follows. First, relabel the qubits so
that K can be written in the form K =
⊗m/2
j=1 Kj (where Kj ∈ U). For each Kj , there is a point
K˜j ∈ U˜ within distance ‖Kj − K˜j‖ ≤ 8δ. We then define K˜ =
⊗m/2
j=1 K˜j.
We upper-bound the distance ‖K − K˜‖ as follows, by defining a sequence of intermediate steps,
and using the triangle inequality. For all s = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,m/2, define K(s) = (K˜1⊗· · ·⊗K˜s)⊗(Ks+1⊗
· · · ⊗Km/2). Then we have that K = K(0), K˜ = K(m/2), and
‖K − K˜‖ ≤
m/2−1∑
s=0
‖K(s) −K(s+1)‖
=
m/2−1∑
s=0
∥∥(K˜1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ K˜s)⊗ (Ks+1 − K˜s+1)⊗ (Ks+2 ⊗ · · · ⊗Km/2)∥∥
≤ (m/2) 8δ = 4mδ,
(82)
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where we used the fact that ‖A⊗B‖ = ‖A‖ ‖B‖.
Finally, we consider the set Λ of all 2-local depth-d measurement outcomes:
Λ = {M ∈ (C2×2)⊗m |M = (K†1 · · ·K†d) (Kd · · ·K1), where K1, . . . ,Kd ∈ L}. (83)
We then define the set Λ˜ as follows:
Λ˜ = {M ∈ (C2×2)⊗m |M = (K†1 · · ·K†d) (Kd · · ·K1), where K1, . . . ,Kd ∈ L˜}. (84)
Note that Λ˜ has cardinality |Λ˜| ≤ |L˜|d.
We claim that Λ˜ is an 8dmδ-net for Λ, with respect to the operator norm ‖·‖. To see this, consider
any M ∈ Λ, and construct some M˜ ∈ Λ˜ that approximates it as follows. M can be written in the
form M = (K†1 · · ·K†d) (Kd · · ·K1) (where Kj ∈ L). For each Kj, there is a point K˜j ∈ L˜ within
distance ‖Kj − K˜j‖ ≤ 4mδ. We then let M˜ = (K˜†1 · · · K˜†d) (K˜d · · · K˜1).
We upper-bound the distance ‖M − M˜‖ as follows, by defining a sequence of intermediate steps,
and using the triangle inequality. For all s = 0, 1, 2, . . . , 2d, define M (s) to be an operator of the
form (K†1 · · ·K†d) (Kd · · ·K1), where the first s factors (reading from left to right) have tilde’s, and
the remaining 2d− s factors do not have tilde’s. Then we have that M =M (0), M˜ =M (2d), and
‖M − M˜‖ ≤
2d−1∑
s=0
‖M (s) −M (s+1)‖
=
d−1∑
s=0
∥∥(K˜†1 · · · K˜†s)(K†s+1 − K˜†s+1)(K†s+2 · · ·K†d) (Kd · · ·K1)∥∥
+
2d−1∑
s=d
∥∥(K˜†1 · · · K˜†d) (K˜d · · · K˜2d−s+1)(K2d−s − K˜2d−s)(K2d−s−1 · · ·K1)∥∥
≤ 2d · 4mδ = 8dmδ,
(85)
where we used the fact that ‖AB‖ ≤ ‖A‖ ‖B‖.
Finally, we set δ = µ/(8dm). Then Λ˜ is a µ-net for Λ, with respect to the operator norm ‖·‖.
The cardinality of Λ˜ is
|Λ˜| ≤ |L˜|d ≤ (m!)d |U˜ |md/2
≤ (m!)d ( 2√2δ + 1)16md
≤ mmd ( 16√2dmµ + 1)16md
≤ ( 24dm17/16µ )16md,
(86)
provided that µ ≤ 1. This proves Lemma 4.2. 
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A Large deviation bounds
A.1 Sums of several random variables
We prove Proposition 2.6, a large-deviation bound for sums of t-wise independent random variables.
The proof is essentially the same as in [14], with minor modifications because the random variables
have different distributions. First we use Markov’s inequality:
Pr(|Y | ≥ λ) ≤ 1
λt
E(|Y |t) = 1
λt
E(Y t). (87)
Now let Γ1, . . . ,ΓN be independent random variables uniformly distributed in {0, 1}, and define
Y˜ =
∑N
x=1(−1)Γxax (the same expression as Y , but replacing the random variables H(x) with Γx).
Since the H(x) are t-wise independent, we know that
E(Y t) = E(Y˜ t). (88)
(To see this, write Y =
∑N
x=1(1−2H(x))ax, which is a linear function of the random variables H(x);
hence Y t is a degree-t polynomial in the variables H(x).)
We can then bound E(Y˜ t) as follows (using Hoeffding’s inequality, letting y = x2/t/2v, and using
Stirling’s inequality):
E(Y˜ t) =
∫ ∞
0
Pr(Y˜ t > x)dx =
∫ ∞
0
Pr(|Y˜ | > x1/t)dx
≤
∫ ∞
0
2 exp(−x2/t/2v)dx
= 2
∫ ∞
0
e−y(2v)t/2(t/2)y(t/2)−1dy
= 2(2v)t/2 · (t/2)!
< 2(2v)t/2 · e1/(6t)
√
πt(t/2e)t/2
= 2e1/(6t)
√
πt(vt/e)t/2.
(89)
This proves Proposition 2.6. 
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A.2 Quadratic functions of several random variables
We prove Proposition 2.7, a large-deviation bound for quadratic functions of 2t-wise independent
random variables. We begin by re-stating the Hanson-Wright inequality [16], specialized to the
case of Rademacher random variables, and with explicit constants. (Note that a stronger bound is
possible, involving A in place of A˜; see [17] for details.)
Lemma A.1. Let ξ1, . . . , ξN be independent random variables, uniformly distributed in {1,−1}. Let
A ∈ RN×N be a symmetric matrix, AT = A. Define the random variable
T =
N∑
i,j=1
Aij(ξiξj − E ξiξj). (90)
Then ET = 0, and we have the following large-deviation bound: for any λ > 0,
Pr(T ≥ λ) ≤ exp
(
−1
8
min
{
λ
‖A˜‖
,
λ2
‖A˜‖2F
})
, (91)
where A˜ ∈ RN×N is the entry-wise absolute value of A, that is, A˜ij = |Aij |.
We now consider the random variable S in Prop. 2.7. S is identical to T , except that the fully-
independent random variables ξi are replaced by the 2t-wise-independent random variables (−1)H(x).
We bound S using the same argument as in [14]. First we use Markov’s inequality:
Pr(|S| ≥ λ) ≤ 1
λt
E(|S|t) = 1
λt
E(St). (92)
Since the H(x) are 2t-wise independent, and S is a quadratic function of the variables (−1)H(x) =
1− 2H(x), we know that
E(St) = E(T t). (93)
We can then bound E(T t) as follows (using Lemma A.1, letting Λ = ‖A˜‖ and ΛF = ‖A˜‖F , letting
y = 18 (x
2/t/Λ2F ) and z =
1
8 (x
1/t/Λ), and using Stirling’s inequality):
E(T t) =
∫ ∞
0
Pr(T t > x)dx =
∫ ∞
0
Pr(|T | > x1/t)dx
≤
∫ ∞
0
2 exp
(
−1
8
min
{
x1/t
Λ
,
x2/t
Λ2F
})
dx
=
∫ (Λ2F /Λ)t
0
2 exp
(− 18 (x2/t/Λ2F ))dx+ ∫ ∞
(Λ2F /Λ)
t
2 exp
(− 18 (x1/t/Λ))dx
=
∫ (1/8)Λ2F /Λ2
0
2e−y(8Λ2F )
t/2(t/2)y(t/2)−1dy +
∫ ∞
(1/8)Λ2F /Λ
2
2e−z(8Λ)ttzt−1dz
< 2(8Λ2F )
t/2 · (t/2)! + 2(8Λ)t · t!
< 2(8Λ2F )
t/2 · e1/(6t)
√
πt(t/2e)t/2 + 2(8Λ)t · e1/(12t)
√
2πt(t/e)t
= 2e1/(6t)
√
πt
(4Λ2F t
e
)t/2
+ 2e1/(12t)
√
2πt
(8Λt
e
)t
.
(94)
This proves Proposition 2.7. 
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